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FIFTH AMENDMENT-CONFESSIONS AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977).
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION- RIGHT TO
COUNSEL
The United States Supreme Court, in Mi-
randa v. Arizona,1 set forth specific procedural
guidelines to protect the constitutional rights
of a criminal suspect during police interroga-
tion.2 Since the time of this sweeping decision,
the Court has been faced with the task of
further explicating and refining the broad rea-
soning which is present in the Miranda decision.
In its last term, the Supreme Court examined
the Miranda issues of "custody" and "waiver" in
two cases. In Oregon v. Mathiason,3 the Supreme
Court further defined the concept of custody
and held that a parolee who came voluntarily
to a state patrol office to be questioned about a
recently committed burglary was not in cus-
tody, and therefore the absence of Miranda
warnings prior to the defendant's incriminating
admissions did not dictate exclusion of these
statements at his trial. In Brewer v. Williams,
4
the Court was faced with the issue of the
adequacy of a defendant's waiver of the right
to counsel during custodial interrogation. The
Court, in a move which surprised many, specif-
ically declined to review the Miranda holding. 5
Instead, the Court, in a five to four decision,
6
held that the circumstances in Brewer were
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that certain
procedural safeguards should be adhered to in order
to protect the defendant's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination during the coercive setting
of custodial interrogation. The defendant must be
advised that he has a right to remain silent, that
anything he says may be used against him, that he
has a right to have an attorney present during ques-
tioning, and that if he cannot afford an attorney,
one will be appointed for him. Id. at 444.
3 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
4 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977).
51 Id. at 1259. In doing so the Court avoided the
plea of twenty-two states which had filed petitions as
amid curiae urging the Court to use the case as a
means to narrow the Miranda decision.
6 Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the
Court. Mr. Justice Marshall, Mr. Justice Powell and
Mr. Justice Stevens filed concurring opinions. Mr.
Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion. Mr.
"constitutionally indistinguishable" from those
presented in Massiah v. United States7 and that
the defendant was denied his right to counsel.
In Brewer a defendant was transported from
the place he had surrendered to the place
where the crime he was accused of had oc-
curred. The defendant had been arraigned
and was represented by counsel. The defend-
ant's attorneys were promised by the transport-
ing detectives that they would not question the
defendant; however, while in the car a detective
managed to elicit statements from the defend-
ant which proved to be very damaging. The
Court held that the State had failed to show an
adequate waiver of the defendant's right to
counsel and that the defendant's sixth and
fourteenth amendment rights had been vio-
lated by the use of these statements at the
defendant's trial.
The area of the law of confessions has partic-
ularly split the Burger Court in recent years.
However, the general trend appears to be to-
ward limiting Miranda to its specific factual
setting and reducing the "technical" nature of
its requirements.8 In Miranda, the Court rea-
Justice White filed a dissenting opinion. Mr. Justice
Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion joined by Mr.
Justice White and Mr. Justice Rehnquist.
7 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In Massiah an indicted de-
fendant's conversation with a government informer
was surreptitiously recorded. The Court held that
proof of this conversation could not be used at the
defendant's trial since the recording of this conver-
sation violated the defendant's right to have his
attorney present at this "conversation."
8 See generally Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S.
341 (1976) (Miranda warnings not required in criminal
tax investigation); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1975) (no per se rule prohibits all questioning after a
suspect has indicated a desire to remain silent);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (police
departure from Miranda's "prophylactic standards"
did not mandate exclusion of defendant's confession);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (use of
confession obtained without required warnings al-
lowed for impeachment purposes).
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soned that the interrogation of a suspect in
custody was inherently coercive.9 In order to
protect the defendant's fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination, the Court held
that a defendant must be clearly advised of his
right to have counsel present at any police
interrogation. ° The Court further held that a
state would have a "heavy burden" of proving
that a defendant waived his right to counsel
and to remain silent if interrogation takes place
after the defendant has requested an attorney."
The Brewer and Mathiason decisions dealt
with the two major Miranda issues of "custody"
and "waiver." These issues are frequently liti-
gated by defense attorneys who wish to have
their clients' incriminating statements and evi-
dence derived from these statements sup-
pressed.1 2 The issue of custody is important in
determining whether Miranda guidelines are
applicable because the procedural safeguards
enunciated in Miranda are specifically limited
An individual swept from familiar surround-
ings into police custody, surrounded by an-
tagonistic forces, and subjected to the tech-
niques of persuasion ... cannot be otherwise
than under compulsion to speak. As a practical
matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated
setting of the police station may well be greater
than in courts or other official investigations,
where there are often impartial observers to
guard against intimidation or trickery.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 461.
11 "The need for counsel to protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a
right to consult with counsel prior to questioning,
but also to have counsel present during any question-
ing if the defendant so desires." Id. at 470.
, If the individual states that he wants an attor-
ney, the interrogation must cease until an
attorney is present. At that time, the individual
must have an opportunity to confer with the
attorney and to have him present during any
subsequent questioning .... If the interroga-
tion continues without the presence of an
attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy
burden rests on the government to demon-
strate that the defendant knowingly and intel-
ligently waived his privilege against self-in-
crimination and his right to retained or ap-
pointed counsel .... [A] valid waiver will not
be presumed simply from the silence of the
accused after warnings are given or simply
from the fact that a confession was in fact
eventually obtained.
Id. at 474-75.
12 Suppression is sought through the use of the
"fruit of the poison tree" doctrine which mandates
the exclusion of derivative evidence gained from
improper police action. See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
to "custodial interrogation. 1' 3 The absence of
the required Miranda warnings in a custodial
situation would mandate the exclusion of any
incriminating statement made by a suspect.
However, in non-custodial interrogations Mi-
randa warnings are not required to be given to
a suspect. The issue of waiver arises subsequent
to a determination that a suspect is in custody
and is entitled to the procedural safeguards of
Miranda. This issue focuses on the defendant's
knowing abstention from using his right to
remain silent or to have an attorney present at
interrogation. If a statement is taken from a
suspect a court must find that the suspect
knowingly and voluntarily waived both of these
rights before allowing the statement to be ad-
mitted into evidence against the defendant.
In Oregon v. Mathiason,'4 the Supreme Court
was faced with the task of further defining the
term "custodial interrogation." It is only during
custodial interrogation that the procedural and
substantive safeguards of Miranda apply.1 5 In
Mathiason, a burglary victim told a state police
officer that she suspected the defendant, a
parolee, had committed the crime. The officer
went to the defendant's apartment during the
process of investigating the burglary and when
he was unable to find him left a card asking
the defendant to call him. When the defendant
called, the officer asked him where it would be
convenient to meet. Since the defendant had
no preference the officer arranged to meet
him at the state patrol office.
When the defendant arrived at the office he
was questioned about the burglary. The ques-
tioning officer falsely asserted that the defend-
ant's fingerprints had been found at the scene
of the crime and a few minutes later the de-
fendant confessed to having committed the
crime. The officer then advised the defendant
of his Miranda rights and tape-recorded a
confession. At the end of the recording the
defendant was informed that he was not under
arrest and was free to go.
At his subsequent bench trial for first-degree
burglary the defendant moved to suppress his
confession as a product of initial questioning
by the police not preceded by the warnings
required in Miranda. The trial court ruled that
the defendant was not in custody at the time of
13 384 U.S. at 444.
14 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
1" See note 2 supra.
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his statements and therefore declined to ex-
clude his confession. The Court of Appeals of
Oregon affirmed the defendant's conviction.' 6
In a four to three decision, however, the Su-
preme Court of Oregon reversed the conviction
holding that the defendant's interrogation took
place in a "coercive environment."' 7 The fac-
tors comprising this "coercive environment"
were the following: "the parties were in the
offices of the State Police; they were alone
behind closed doors; the officer informed the
defendant he was a suspect in a theft and the
authorities had evidence incriminating him in
the crime; and that the defendant was a parolee
under supervision."' 8 The Oregon Supreme
Court found that these factors were not "over-
come by evidence that the defendant came to
the office in response to a request and was told
he was not under arrest."'9 This evidence,
while superficially indicating some voluntari-
ness on the part of the defendant's actions, did
not negate the coercive factors present within
the interrogation setting.
In reversing the Oregon Supreme Court,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that it
had interpreted the term "custodial interroga-
tion" too broadly. In a per curiam opinion,2
the Court found that the defendant's freedom
was not restricted in any way which could be
termed "custodial." The Court referred to its
definition of custodial interrogation in the Mi-
randa decision where it was defined as "ques-
tioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way."'21 The Court relied heavily
on the facts which showed that the defendant
came to the state patrol office of his own
accord, that the questioning of the defendant
only took one half hour and that the defendant
was allowed to leave the station after his confes-
sion. The Court reasoned that it was clear
16 State v. Mathiason, 22 Or. App. 494, 539 P.2d
1122 (1975).
17 State v. Mathiason, 275 Or. 1, 549 P.2d 673
(1976).
Is Id. at __, 549 P.2d at 675 (official reporter not
yet published).
19 Id., 549 P.2d at 675.
20 Mr. Justice Brennan would have granted the
writ of certiorari but dissented from the summary
disposition of the case and would grant oral argu-
ment. Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Stevens
filed dissenting opinions.
21 384 U.S. at 444.
from these facts that the defendant was not in
custody "or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way.122 The Court
further noted that the fact that the investigating
officer had lied when he told the defendant
that his fingerprints had been found at the
scene of the crime was irrelevant to the deter-
mination of the issue as to whether the defend-
ant was in custody."3
Justice Marshall, in dissent, argued that the
Court was placing too much emphasis on "for-
malities" and that an "objective standard" of
custody, which would examine the defendant's
objectively reasonable beliefs, should be used
in determining whether the defendant was in
custody for purposes of Miranda.24 Essentially,
Justice Marshall felt that an objectively reason-
able belief that one is not free to leave during
questioning constitutes a deprivation of one's
"freedom of action in a significant way." Mar-
shall felt that the circumstances surrounding
the defendant's confession constituted a situa-
tion in which there were "inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the indi-
vidual's will to resist and to compel him to
speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely,"' 5 and that therefore the Miranda warn-
ings were a necessary prerequisite to the admis-
sion of the defendant's confession at his trial.
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion,
attached particular significance to the fact that
the defendant was on parole at the time of his
interrogation at the police station. Stevens felt
that since "a parolee is technically in legal
custody until his sentence has been served"'
26
the defendant was significantly "deprived of
his freedom of action" when he arrived at the
police station to be interrogated.
The decision in Mathiason is indicative of the
general trend of the present Court to narrow
the sweeping holdings of the Miranda decision.
By narrowing the definition of what constitutes
"custodial interrogation" the Court is also nar-
rowing the circumstances in which the Miranda
22 429 U.S. at 494.
23Id.
24 Id. at 496 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25 384 U.S. at 467. Justice Marshall also hoped that
the Mathiason decision "does not suggest that police
officers can circumvent Miranda by deliberately post-
poning the official "arrest" and the giving of Miranda
warnings until the necessary incriminating statements
had been obtained." 429 U.S. at 499 n.5 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
26 429 U.S. at 500 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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guidelines will be in effect. Unlike the reason-
ing of the Miranda decision which emphasized
the alien surroundings in which a suspect is
usually questioned 2 7 the Court in Mathiason
instead chose to emphasize the importance of
actual physical restraint in defining a custodial
setting.
Generally, there have been two different
tests of custody used by the courts since the
Miranda decision. These tests are those of "fo-
cus" and "objectivity." The "focus" test of cus-
tody had its origins in Escobedo v. Illinois2s where
the Court stated that the right to counsel at-
taches "when the process shifts from investiga-
tory to accusatory. ' 29 The "focus" test reasons
that custody arises when the investigating offi-
cer has probable cause to make an arrest of the
suspect and is generally regarded as a defense-
oriented test.30 The "objective test" of custody
relies on a defendant's reasonable perceptions
in determining whether he was in custody for
purposes of Miranda safeguards. 31 Basically,
the "objective" test of custody seeks to deter-
mine whether under the particular circum-
stances a reasonable man would believe himself
to be in custody.
In Mathiason, the Supreme Court has contin-
ued to follow its own trend and the trend of
lower federal courts toward a more formal
definition of "custodial interrogation." This
movement was clearly signalled by the Court in
Beckwith v. United States. 32 In an opinion written
by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that
the fact that a criminal tax investigation had
focused on the defendant did not constitute
custody for Miranda purposes. In rejecting the
focus test of custody the Supreme Court specif-
ically stressed that it was the custodial nature
of interrogation which triggers the necessity of
the Miranda safeguards. The Court expressly
27 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 469.
28 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
19 Id. at 492.
30 For courts which have utilized the "focus" test of
custody to determine whether or not the Miranda
warnings were required, see United States v. Oliver,
505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bey,
385 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Pa. 1974). Additionally, some
state courts have grounded their use of the "focus"
test on their own state constitutions. See Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
31 THE PROSECUTOR'S DESKBOOK 169 (P. Healy & J.
Manak eds. 1971).
32 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
declared that focus could not be equated with
custody for purposes of Miranda. Additionally,
the Court has made it clear that Miranda does
not apply to non-restraint situations in the
recent cases of United States v. Mandujano and
Garner v. United States.34 In Mandujano the
Court held that the grand jury setting is non-
custodial and that, therefore, Miranda warnings
need not be given before testimony is taken. In
Garner the Court held that preparation of one's
own tax return is done in a non-custodial
setting to which Miranda does not apply.
The custody test set forth by the Court in
Mathiason is one of physical restraint. This
standard generally supports lower federal court
definitions of custody.33 However, an area of
difficulty that arises from the Court's over
reliance on formal custody in Mathiason is the
relationship of this "restraint" emphasis to the
"objective" test of custody that is being used by
a number of lower federal courts.3 6 If the
objective test of custody had been used in
Mathiason the Court would have analyzed the
reasonableness of the defendant's claim of per-
ceived custody. While the "restraint" test of
custody is easily applied by the lower courts
3 7
it seems that the Court has oversimplified what
was originally meant by custody in the Miranda
decision. The Mathiason Court seemed to accent
the formalistic concept of custody while deem-
phasizing some of the factors which tended to
- 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
34 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
" When a suspect is allowed to go free after police
interrogation most courts hold that the setting was
non-custodial. See United States v. Manglona, 414
F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Scully, 415
F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1969); Virgin Islands v. Berne, 412
F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1969); Nobles v. United States, 391
F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1968); Evans v. United States, 377
F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Clark, 294
F. Supp. 1108 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
36. The "objective" test of custody seeks to deter-
mine whether under the circumstances of a case, a
reasonable man would believe himself to be in cus-
tody. See generally United States v. Planche, 525 F.2d
899 (5th Cir. 1976); Iverson v. North Dakota, 480
F.2d 414 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1044 (1973);
Fisher v. Scafati, 439 F.2d 307 (lst Cir.), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 939 (1971); Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d
1391 (9th Cir. 1969). The "objective" test of custody
has never been explicitly rejected nor accepted by
the Supreme Court.
3' Lower courts need only examine whether or not
the defendant was under formal arrest or some
equivalent form of physical detention.
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show that the defendant did not voluntarily
walk into the police station to be questioned. 38
Mathiason clearly rejects the "focus" test of
custody " and makes it clear that the concept of
custodial interrogation will depend largely on
formal indicia of physical restraint.
In Brewer v. Williams, 40 a defendant suspected
of abducting a ten-year-old girl in Des Moines,
Iowa, agreed to surrender, on advice of his
Des Moines attorney, to police in Davenport,
Iowa. The defendant was arrested, arraigned
and jailed in Davenport while awaiting trans-
portation back to Des Moines. Both his Des
Moines attorney and his attorney at the Daven-
port arraignment advised the defendant not to
make any statements until he was returned to
Des Moines and permitted to confer with his
Des Moines attorney. An agreement not to
question the defendant on the trip back to Des
Moines was secured by the defendant's attor-
neys from the detectives who were to drive the
defendant back to Des Moines when the de-
fendant's Davenport attorney was denied per-
38 The primary fact that the Court did not fully
evaluate was the defendant's legal status as a parolee.
It would seem that this particular fact would tend to
minimize the "voluntariness" of the defendant's trip
to the police station. As Justice Stevens duly noted in
his dissenting opinion, the defendant was still tech-
nically a prisoner of the state.
Additionally, the holding by the Court that the
fact that the investigator lied to the defendant about
having his fingerprints at the scene of the crime is
irrelevant to the determination of custody, seems to
conflict with the general formula for the determina-
tion of custody now used by most courts. See Smith,
The Threshold Question In Applying Miranda: What Con-
stitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C.L. REv. 699
(1974).
Smith notes that the following factors are to be
analyzed to determine if an interrogation was custo-
dial:
(1) the nature of the interrogator;
(2) the nature of the suspect;
(3) the time and place of the interrogation;
(4) the nature of the interrogation; and
(5) the progress of the investigation at the time
of the interrogation.
All of these five factors should be examined equally.
Id. at 702-35.
11 It should be remembered, however, that a de-
fense attorney could still argue for the application of
the "focus" test of custody on state constitutional
grounds. See note 30 supra; Wilkes, The New Federal-
ism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the
Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974).
40 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977).
mission to ride in the police car with the de-
fendant and the detectives.
At no time during the trip back to Des
Moines did the defendant express a willingness
to be interrogated without having his attorney
present. Instead, he stated several times that
he would tell the authorities "the whole story"
after he conferred in Des Moines with his attor-
ney. The detective riding in the back seat of
the squad car with the defendant was aware
that he was a former mental patient and deeply
religious. This detective engaged the defendant
in a "wide-ranging conversation covering a va-
riety of topics, including the subject of reli-
gion .41 Eventually this detective delivered what
has been termed the "Christian burial speech"42
in which he told the defendant that he felt that
they should stop and locate the victim's body
because her parents deserved a Christian burial
for the girl. When the defendant asked the
detective why he thought the missing girl's
body was on the route back to Des Moines, the
detective falsely asserted that he knew the girl's
body was in the area that they would pass on
their way to Des Moines .43 The detective then
told the defendant that he didn't want him to
answer or discuss it any further. He simply
told the defendant to "think about it as we're
41 Id. at 1236.
42 The detective's speech was referred to as the
"Christian burial speech" in the briefs and oral argu-
ments of the opposing parties. Addressing Williams
(the defendant) as "Reverend," the Detective said:
I want to give you something to think about
while we're traveling down the road .... Num-
ber one, I want you to observe the weather
conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting, it's freezing,
driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's
going to be dark early this evening. They are
predicting several inches of snow for tonight,
and I feel that you yourself are the only person
that knows where this little girl's body is, that
you yourself have only been there once, and if
you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be
unable to find it. And, since we will be going
right past the area on the way into Des Moines,
I feel that we could stop and locate the body,
that the parents of this little girl should be
entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl
who was snatched away from them on Christmas
Eve and murdered. And I feel we should stop
and locate it on the way in rather than waiting
until morning and trying to come back out after
a snow storm and possibly not being able to
find it at all.
Id.43 id. at 1236 n.l.
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riding down the road .,44 Shortly thereafter the
defendant led the police to the girl's body.
45
At trial, the defendant's motion to suppress
the use of the victim's body as evidence and all
the testimony of his actions during the car trip
was denied because the court found that he
had adequately waived his rights to remain
silent and to have counsel present during his
confession. On appeal the defendant's convic-
tion was upheld by a five to four majority of
the Iowa Supreme Court.46 The majority rea-
soned that the detective's suggestions to the
defendant did not constitute interrogation and
that the defendant had volunteered his state-
ments.
The defendant obtained a writ of habeas
corpus from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa which found
that the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment
rights had been violated. 47 The district court
specifically concluded:
When the police have agreed with the defend-
ant's attorney that the defendant will not be
questioned in the attorney's absence, when an-
other attorney has asked to be with the defend-
ant at a particular time and place, and when the
defendant has repeatedly asserted his desire not
to talk in the absence of counsel, the police
plainly should not be permitted to interrogate
the defendant at all until further notice is given
to counsel.
48
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's
granting of the writ of habeas corpus in a two
to one decision.49 The court stated that there
were "no facts to support the conclusion of the
state court that appellee [defendant] had
waived his constitutional rights other than that
appellee had made incriminating statements.
Although oral or written expression of waiver
44 Id. at 1236.
4- This occurred after the defendant first unsuc-
cessfully attempted to show the detectives where he
had left the victim's shoes and the blanket in which
he had carried the victim.
4'6 State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Ia.1971).
4 Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa
1974). The district court concluded that the
detective's "Christian burial speech" did indeed con-
stitute interrogation and violated the police officers'
agreement with the defendant's attorney in which it
was promised that the defendant would not be inter-
rogated on the trip back to Des Moines.
41 Id. at 178-79.
41 Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1975).
is not required, waiver of one's rights may not
be presumed from a silent record."5 0
In affirming the decision of the Eighth Cir-
cuit, the Supreme Court specifically stated that
it did not have to decide the Miranda or volun-
tariness issues which were raised in the case.
51
Instead the Court based its decision on Massiah
v. United States. 52 In Massiah, the Court held
inadmissible the defendant's incriminating
statements after indictment in absence of coun-
sel. The Court stated that "the clear rule of
Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have
commenced against an individual, he has a
right to legal representation when the govern-
ment interrogates him. 53 In Brewer the defend-
ant had been arrested on a warrant issued by a
Des Moines magistrate, had been arraighied
before a Davenport magistrate and had been
committed to jail. The Court had little trouble
finding that adversary proceedings had begun
and that the defendant had a right to the
assistance of counsel. 54 Once it was clear that
the defendant had a right to counsel, the issue
presented by Brewer, as formulated by Justice
Stewart, was whether the defendant was de-
prived of his constitutional right to counsel.
Since the defendant made his incriminating
statements outside the presence of counsel, the
narrow issue became whether or not the de-
fendant adequately waived his right to have
counsel present when he gave his statements.
In dealing with the waiver issue the Court
applied the standard set forth in Johnson v.
Zerbst55 which called for the State to prove "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege." 56 The Court held
that the facts in Brewer "failed to provide a
reasonable basis for finding that Williams [the
defendant] waived his right to assistance of
counsel. 5 7 The Court specifically noted that
50 Id. at 233.
51 Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Stewart
stated: "Specifically, there is no need to review in
this case the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, a doctrine
designed to secure the constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination. It is equally unneces-
sary to evaluate the ruling of the District Court that
Williams' self-incriminating statements were, indeed,
involuntarily made." Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. at
1239.
52 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
53 97 S. Ct. at 1240.
54 Id. at 1239.
55 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
5 6 
Id. at 464.
57 97 S. Ct. at 1243.
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"waiver requires not merely comprehension
but relinquishment, and Williams' consistent
reliance upon the advise of counsel in dealing
with the authorities refutes any suggestion that
he waived that right.""8
The Court also noted that the detective's
"Christian burial speech" constituted interro-
gation of the defendant in direct violation of
the officer's agreement with the defendant's
attorneys. 59 This ruling by the Court was vital
to its holding that the defendant had been
denied his right to counsel. If the Court had
found that the defendant had confessed with-
out any prompting it could not be stated that
the defendant was denied counsel at the critical
stage of post-arrest interrogation. Without this
ruling, the Court could have held that a know-
ing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel
was not required since there was no police
interrogation. A major factor in determining
that the detective's "Christian burial speech"
constituted interrogation was the detective's
specific intent in making this speech. The rec-
ord from the trial court's suppression hearing
clearly showed that the detective's only motive
in making his speech to the defendant was to
elicit information concerning the whereabouts
of the missing girl.60 The intent of the officer
led the Court to note that he had "deliberately
and designedly set out to elicit information
from Williams [the defendant] just as surely
as-and perhaps more effectively than-if he
had formally interrogated him. '"61
Having held that the officer's speech consti-
tuted interrogation and that the circumstances
of the case did not evidence an adequate waiver
of the defendant's right to counsel, the Court
ruled that the defendant had been deprived of
his fourteenth and sixth amendment rights to
MId. at 1242.
5 Although there was some dispute over the exis-
tence of an agreement not to question the defendant,
the Supreme Court adopted the trial court's findings
of facts regarding the defendant's original motion to
suppress which stated "that there was an agreement
between defense counsel and police officials to the
effect that defendant was not to be questioned on
the trip to Des Moines." State v. Williams, 182
N.W.2d 396, 402 (1971). See note 42 supra.
60 97 S. Ct. at 1240. Justice Stewart also noted that
counsel for the state had, during oral arguments
before the Court, stipulated that the detective's
"Christian burial speech" was a form of interrogation.
Id. at 1240 n.6.
61 Id. at 1239.
the assistance of counsel.6 2 The right to counsel
was termed by Justice Stewart as "indispensable
to the fair administration of our adversary
system of criminal justice."'  The Court ac-
knowledged the fact that the defendant was
convicted of a "senseless and brutal" crime;
however, the majority felt that such a clear
violation of the defendant's right to counsel
could not be condoned.6
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissenting opin-
ion, termed the result in Brewer "intolerable in
any society which purports to call itself an
organized society." 5 The Chief Justice argued
that the evidence which was being excluded by
the majority's decision was reliable and was
voluntarily given. Since he reasoned that the
"fundamental purpose of the Sixth Amend-
ment is to safeguard the fairness of the trial
and the integrity of the factfinding process,
' 66
he concluded that the defendant's essential
sixth amendment right had not been violated
by the introduction of evidence relating to
statements made without benefit of counsel
which were introduced at his trial. The Chief
Justice described the exclusionary rule as a
rule which "mechanically and blindly keeps
reliable evidence from juries whether the con-
stitutional violation involves gross police mis-
conduct or honest human error. ' 67 While char-
acterizing the police behavior in Brewer as non-
egregious, the Chief Justice concluded by ar-
guing that the exclusionary rule should be
applied only where the benefits clearly out-
weigh the costs.68
The future of the exclusionary rule in cases
dealing with the fifth and sixth amendments
seems uncertain, especially where the alleged
improper evidence can be labeled as reliable.
It is evident that the four dissenting justices in
Brewer were relying on Burger's cost-benefit
computation in arguing against the use of the
62Id. at 1243.
63 Id. at 1239.
64 Id. at 1243. Justice Marshall, Id. at 1244 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring), and Justice Stevens, Id. at 1247
(Stevens, J., concurring), in separate concurring
opinions, both mentioned the difficult "emotional
aspects" of the case. However, both Justices felt that
this was little reason to condone an intentional police
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.
6 Id. at 1248 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 1253.
67 Id. at 1248.
68 Id. at 1250.
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exclusionary rule.6 9 In assessing the future of
the exclusionary rule in the area of the law of
confessions, it should be noted that Justice
Powell, in his concurring opinion, indicated
that he is personally reluctant to apply the
exclusionary rule on a per se basis.7" His con-
currence tended to embrace the Chief Justice's
cost-benefit analysis; however, he felt that there
were substantial benefits to be gained by apply-
ing the exclusionary rule to Brewer. These ben-
efits were largely based on improvements to be
made in the relationship between investigating
police and a suspect's attorney. But, if a situa-
tion arises in the future which either presents a
great cost or little benefit to the criminal justice
system in applying the exclusionary rule, the
Court may decline to use it. This may be
especially said of collateral federal appeals after
a defendant has had a fair hearing in state
court.
71
The decision in Brewer turns on one's inter-
pretation of the underlying factual setting in
69 The four dissenting justices all felt that the costs
in applying the exclusionary rule to Brewer were too
great. They feared the defendant would go free
since it was thought that a retrial of the defendant
would be impossible because eight years had passed
since the crime was committed. However, the dissent-
ingjustices' fears proved unfounded. The defendant
was recently convicted at a new trial. People v.
Williams, Criminal Docket No. 55805 Iowa Jul. 15,
1977). The defendant was subsequently sentenced to
a mandatory term of life imprisonment.
It should also be noted that the state was able to
introduce the vital evidence of the victim's body at
this new trial by using the theory of "inevitable
discovery" to avoid possible suppression. This theory
was essentially based on the argument that the vic-
tim's body would have been discovered, without
regard to the defendant's statements, on purely in-
dependent grounds. The use of this theory of "inev-
itable discovery" at the defendant's retrial was first
suggested by Justice Stewart in a footnote which is at
the end of the majority opinion. 97 S. Ct. at 1243 n.12.
70 97 S. Ct. at 1247 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). In
discussing the exclusionary rule, Justice Powell noted
that "[a]ll too often applying the rule in a [per se]
fashion results in freeing the guilty without any
offsetting enhancement of the rights of all citizens."
Id.
71 See Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976), where
the Court held that a federal court need not apply
the exclusionary rule on habeas corpus review of a
fourth amendment claim absent a showing that the
state prisoner was denied an opportunity for a full
and fair litigation of that claim. Chief Justice Burger
unsuccessfully argued for the application of this
reasoning to the sixth amendment claim in Brewer.
97 S. Ct. at 1254 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
which the defendant made his incriminating
statements. The fact that the case was reviewed
by three different courts of appellate jurisdic-
tion and resulted in bare majorities at every
level supports this assertion. 7 A major factor
in the factual setting of Brewer which made it
difficult for the state to carry its burden of
showing an adequate waiver was the violation
of the agreement not to interrogate the defend-
ant by the police officers. Most federal jurisdic-
tions do not require express words of waiver.
73
However, the waiver standard enunciated in
Johnson v. Zerbst74 gives a court great discretion
by stating that "the determination of whether
there has been an intelligent waiver of the
right to counsel must depend, in each case,
upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case. 175 By using this strin-
gent standard of waiver of the right to counsel
the Court was able to examine closely the
behavior of police officials in Brewer. 76 It should
be noted that the attorneys for the defendant
in Brewer fully cooperated with police officials
and expected reciprocal conduct. Instead, po-
lice officials violated a verbal agreement not to
question the counselor's client after creating a
situation in which the defendant's attorney was
not allowed to remain near his client. Although
not explicitly mentioned in the majority deci-
sion, it is clear that the majority felt that the
transporting detectives had violated common
ethical standards by interrogating the defend-
72 The case resulted in a five to four decision in
the Iowa Supreme Court, a two to one decision in
the court of appeals and a five to four decision in the
United States Supreme Court.
73 See Hughes v. Swenson, 452 F.2d 866, 868 (8th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215,
224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022 (1970);
United States v. Ganter, 436 F.2d 364, 369-70 (7th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Hilliker, 436 F.2d 101,
102-03 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 958
(1971); Bond v. United States, 397 F.2d 162, 165
(10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1035 (1969).
4 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
75 Id. at 464.
76 Compare this analysis of police conduct with the
deemphasis by the Court of police conduct in the
area of entrapment. See Note, Entrapment, 67J. CRIM.
L. & C. 422, 429 (1976).
77 By analogy, note that the ABA. Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility forbids communications be-
tween a lawyer or his agent and a party whom the
lawyer knows is represented by counsel. ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1)
(1975). For cases dealing with possible exclusions of
incriminating statements based on professional ethi-
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ant.77 At the very least the majority has indi-
cated that it favors an environment of mutual
cooperation between the police and a suspect's
attorney during a police investigation.
By comparison, Mathiason did not focus to
any great extent on police conduct. The police
deception did not affect the Court's conclusion
as to the nature of custody. Thus the Mathiason
and Brewer decisions appear inconsistent in
their focus on police conduct; however, it must
be remembered that the police conduct in
Brewer represented a serious departure from
acceptable ethical standards.
CONCLUSION
Both the Brewer and Mathiason decisions are
indicative of the growing trend of the Burger
Court to limit the application of Miranda.18 In
keeping with this trend the Court has chosen
to follow the general movement that is present
in the lower federal courts and in the state
courts to limit the holdings of Miranda.7 9 How-
ever, in its continued erosion of the Miranda
procedural safeguards, the Court has had a
tendency to create more ambiguities within the
law of confessions. Thus, instead of helping to
resolve existing questions in this area the Court
has sidestepped many important issues and has
left them unanswered.
In the final analysis it seems that the Court
cal violations see United States v. Four Star, 428 F.2d
1406 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 947 (1970);
United States v. Fellabaum, 408 F.2d 220 (7th Cir.
1969); Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371 (9th
Cir. 1968).
78 Gangi, Supreme Court, Confessions, and the Counter-
Revolution in Criminal Justice, 58 JUD. 68, 73 (1974);
George, Future Trends in the Administration of Criminal
Justice, 69 MIL. L. REv. 1, 11-16 (1975); Steele, Devel-
opments in the Law of Interrogations and Confessions, I
NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 111 (1975); Note, 17 ARiz. L.
REv. 188, 190 (1975); Comment, Michigan v. Mosley
(96 S. Ct. 321) A Further Erosion of Miranda?, 13 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 861 (1976); Case Comment, Criminal
Procedure-Admissibility of Confessions-Dancing on the
Grave of Miranda?, 10 SUrOLK U.L. REv.1141, 1164-
78 (1976).71 See generally Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 118
(5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d
1256 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Marchildon,
519 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Moreno-
Lopez, 466 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1972); Steele, Develop-
ments in the Law of Confessions, I NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF.
111 (1975); Arrington v. Maxwell, 409 F.2d 849 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 944 (1969).
in Brewer was chiefly concerned with maintain-
ing the unfettered role of counsel in police
investigations. Although many law enforce-
ment authorities believe that allowing a sus-
pect's attorney to play an important role in
police investigations hinders the fact-finding
process, it seems evident from the Court's de-
cision in Brewer that a defendant's right to
counsel once adversary proceedings have com-
menced is absolute. At this stage in the criminal
process any alleged waiver by the defendant of
his right to counsel must be clearly established
by the State, which has the burden of showing
an adequate waiver of a constitutional right.
Yet the Brewer Court failed to address the
application of Miranda, the voluntariness of
the defendant's confession and the problem in
applying the "exclusionary rule" to fifth and
sixth amendment issues. Consequently, these
issues will need to be answered in the future.
The most important unresolved issue in Brewer
is the future of the exclusionary rule in the law
of confessions. The Court has already indicated
its desire to limit the scope of the exclusionary
rule in the fourth amendment area of searches
and seizures.10 At the present time it seems
that the Court is also moving toward a more
restrictive role for the exclusionary rule in fifth
and sixth amendment cases8 l where the de-
fendant's statements proposed for admission
into evidence can be labeled as "reliable" and
where it can be said that the defendant was
"fairly" treated. In moving toward such nebu-
lous standards it would seem that the Burger
Court wants to create a greater degree of
discretionary power in the trial courts.
Oregon v. Mathiason limits the application of
Miranda guidelines to police interrogations
which are characterized by some sort of physi-
cal or formal restraint. In narrowing the defi-
nition of custody, the Court limited the kinds
of situations to which Miranda would be appli-
cable. However, the reasoning involved in the
per curiam Mathiason decision failed to promul-
gate specific guideines for lower courts to de-
termine the essential qualities of custodial inter-
rogation and thus left considerable latitude for
subsequent court rulings.
80 See note 71 supra; Brown v. United States, 411
U.S. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165 (1969).
81 See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
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